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Caps and the First Amendment:    
Buckley v. Valeo Revisited 
347 
Moderator: Wayne Barrett* 
Participants: Edward W. Hayes, Esq.** 
 Erik Joerss*** 
 William G. Kastin, Esq.**** 
 Leo Kayser, III, Esq.***** 
 Mark Lopez, Esq.****** 
MR. BARRETT: This panel addresses political campaign 
spending and the First Amendment.  We will examine Buckley v. 
Valeo1 and discuss the impact of that case on congressional power 
to limit campaign spending.  The issue is at what point do cam-
paign spending limits become limits on free speech. 
I am Wayne Barrett.  I am an investigative reporter and I cover 
a lot of campaigns.  Campaign finance stories have taken on a kind 
of disappointing air in recent years because you cannot shock 
 
* Investigative Journalist; Senior Editor, the Village Voice, New York, N.Y. 
** Edward W. Hayes, P.C.; Governor's Committee to Review Audio-Visual Cov-
erage of Court proceedings (1995); New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board 
(1991-1993).  University of Virginia, B.A. 1969; Columbia Law School, J.D. 1972. 
*** Political Organizer/Project Coordinator, Common Cause, New York, N.Y.  
University of Central Florida, B.A. 1994. 
**** Court Attorney, New York Supreme Court, New York County, N.Y.; Staff 
Attorney, New York City Campaign Finance Board (1995-1998).  Boston University, 
B.A., cum laude, 1990; New York Law School, J.D., cum laude, 1993. 
***** Partner, Kayser & Redfern, L.L.P., New York, N.Y.; Committee on Drugs 
and the Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York.  Yale University, B.A. 
1966; University of Virginia, LL.B. 1969. 
****** Senior Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union.  Campbell Univer-
sity, B.S. 1980; Rutgers University School of Law, J.D. 1985. 
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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anymore.2  It has reached the stage where the quid pro quos of 
campaign finance are so routine that they are hardly news, and 
when they become news they seem to have little effect on the elec-
torate.3 
The Supreme Court case that we will analyze today considered 
whether or not campaign contributions are protected speech.4  The 
image that came to my mind was a contributor shouting “gimme” 
at a crowded fund-raiser.  But the Court did rule that expenditure 
caps are a restriction on free speech.5 
Here in New York City, we do have a campaign finance system 
that does have an expenditure cap.6  It is a voluntary program, so 
candidates choose whether or not to participate.7  We just had a 
mayoral election in which all of the major candidates chose to par-
ticipate in the program.8  It certainly did not seem to restrict any-
one’s speech.  In fact, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was able to say so 
much that one New York Magazine ran an advertisement stating 
that it was the only thing for which he had not claimed credit.9 
So we are going to examine the question of expenditure caps as 
a restriction on speech.  We have four excellent panelists.  Our first 
speaker is Edward Hayes, a private attorney and former Assistant 
District Attorney with the Bronx County District Attorney’s Of-
fice.  He has been active in New York politics for much of his ca-
 
2. See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Another Sham Exercise, 30 NAT’L J. 
775 (1998). 
3. See Helen Dewar, Petition Drive May Be Last Hope for Campaign Reform, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1998, at A1.  But see Bradley A. Smith, Real And Imagined Reform 
Of Campaign Corruption:  A Review Of Dirty Little Secrets:  The Persistence Of Corrup-
tion In American Politics, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 141-142 (1996). 
4. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-28. 
5. See id. at 39. 
6. New York City Campaign Finance Act (1988) (codified as NEW YORK CITY 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, §§ 3-701 to 3-715). 
7. See id. 
8. See William Murphy, City Briefing:  A Report on People and Issues in City Gov-
ernment, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1997, at A37 (reporting allegations that both of New York 
City’s major mayoral candidates used their political offices to sidestep spending limits 
while participating in a Campaign Finance Board program that limited fund raising and 
spending in return for matching funds); Adam Nagourney, Giuliani Leads His Opponents 
In Money Raised and Spent, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1997, at B5. 
9. See Felix H. Kent, Mayor Giuliani’s Right of Privacy, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 1998, at 
3. 
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reer and was appointed to the Civilian Complaint Review Board by 
Mayor David Dinkins.  I should also point out that he represents 
many journalists, including Mike McAlary of the Daily News, so 
he does have some interest in the First Amendment.  After Mr. 
Hayes, we will hear from Erik Joerss, a political organizer with 
Common Cause.  Mr. Joerss is actively lobbying for federal fi-
nance campaign reform.  Following Mr. Joerss, we will hear from 
Bill Kastin, an attorney with the New York City Campaign Fi-
nance Board.  Mr. Kastin is a former motions law clerk for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  Following 
Mr. Kastin, we will hear from Leo Kayser, a partner in the law 
firm of Kayser & Redfern.  Mr. Kayser specializes in constitutional 
law, literary property law, and commercial litigation, and was a 
member of the transition team that helped New York Governor 
George Pataki move into office after his election.  The last speaker 
we will hear from is Mark Lopez, a senior staff attorney with the 
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) in New York.  Prior to 
joining the New York office of the ACLU, Mr. Lopez served as a 
senior staff attorney with the ACLU’s National Prison Project.  Af-
ter each panelist speaks, we will have a roundtable discussion and 
open the floor to questions. 
Mr. Hayes is first. 
MR. HAYES: I am a mouthpiece.  Through out my career, my 
job has been to stand next to somebody who obviously did some-
thing atrocious and argue that he did not.  That role has made me 
extremely well suited to discuss campaign finance reform.  First, 
almost since the beginning of time, people have tried to find a way 
to manipulate people in authority.  Campaign finance reform is es-
sentially another way to control people’s natural impulse to corrupt 
those in power.10  The second thing is, by and large, people that 
give money to people who run for office want something in re-
turn.11 
Now, let me discuss something that has raised very serious is-
sues.  Do you remember the news reports about the individual that 
 
10. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28, 45 (1976). 
11. See Jill Abramson, The Nation; Money Buys a Lot More Than Access, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at C4. 
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apparently collected money from Chinese landscapers and Bud-
dhist nuns, and gave the Clinton campaign very large sums of 
money?12  There were reports of a man who visited the White 
House on many occasions, an individual of Chinese descent who 
raised money from a lot of overseas sources.13  It raises issues in 
your mind that must be examined when considering campaign fi-
nance.  The first thing I thought was that he went to the White 
House to bring cash because people sometimes give cash to politi-
cians instead of checks.14 
The second reason why somebody might make a trip to a poli-
tician’s office is to check, for instance, if it would affect trade rela-
tions if three sixteen-year-old kids were shot in the middle of a 
square in Beijing last night.  And the politician might reply, you 
could shoot one, you could shoot two, but three is too many. 
That is a lot of what campaign finance is about.  I am not say-
ing that happened.  What I am saying is that you want to avoid the 
appearance of impropriety.  You do not want anybody to worry 
about improper behavior. 
There are lots of ways to pay somebody to gain advantage.  For 
example, when Rupert Murdoch bought the New York Post he also 
bought a disguised way of making campaign contributions.  Every 
time he can control an editorial page or what a story says, then in a 
way, he is helping himself get a lucrative television license; he is 
winning the love and affection of some United States Senators.15 
Those in the audience who are students at Fordham Law 
School, by and large, when you finish school you are going to 
practice in New York City.  New York City is the absolute heart-
land of wide judicial discretion.16  There are no judges in Manhat-
 
12. See Don Terry, Democratic Fund-Raiser Pleads Guilty to Fraud and Conspir-
acy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A18. 
13. See Amy Keller, Burton to Grill FEC for Going Soft on Gore Friend, ROLL 
CALL, Mar. 26, 1998; Terry, supra note 12, at A18. 
14. See Scott Turow, Reforming Campaign Finance, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 19, 
1997, at F1. 
15. See Frank Rich, Who’s Biased Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at A21; see 
also Clifford J. Levy, Mayor Can’t Force Cable Firm to Add Channel, Judge Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B21. 
16. See Letter to the Editor from George Pataki, Governor, New York, N.Y. L.J., 
Mar. 18, 1996, at 2. 
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tan17 or the Bronx18 who are not picked by the Democratic organi-
zation: none.  There are no Republican judges elected to the New 
York Supreme Court19 in Manhattan or the Bronx.  The key to be-
coming a New York Supreme Court justice in Manhattan is your 
relationship with Mr. Farell,20 the Democratic leader for Manhat-
tan.  All of these things relate to the life that you will lead when 
you leave law school.  The First Amendment issue concerns how 
you live in a free society.  Campaign finance is just one of the 
checks and balances affected by that. 
The essence of the Buckley decision was the idea of the judge 
applying a balancing test.  If you read Robert Bork’s book,21 he 
will say judges should not have balancing tests.  As much as possi-
ble, judges should not exercise their discretion; judges should give 
only an interpretation of the existing law and not make policy.22  
The reason is that, in an indirect way, campaign finance will affect 
those decisions.  If you can collect enough money and your candi-
date is elected, that will have an effect on which judges are ap-
pointed.  Every study has shown that judges tend to reflect the 
politics that they bring with them to the bench in their decisions. 
So my first point is, when you think of campaign finance, first 
think of what kind of life you will lead and where you will play on 
the exercise of the power, which is what lawyers do.  Lawyers are 
basically brokers in the exercise of power.  The opportunity to in-
fluence judges, politicians, and government is at the essence of 
what we do as lawyers.  That is the first issue. 
The second issue is allowing the press to be the watchdogs of 
campaign finance.  People like Wayne Barrett, along with another 
reporter named Andrea Bernstein, who writes for the New York 
 
17. Manhattan—comprising the whole of New York County—is one of the five 
boroughs of New York City.  Each is a separate county. 
18. The Borough of the Bronx comprises the whole of Bronx County, New York. 
19. The New York Supreme Court is the state’s trial-level court of unlimited origi-
nal jurisdiction.  The state’s highest court is the New York Court of Appeals. 
20. New York Assemblyman Herman D. Farell, Jr., chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee. 
21. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
22. See id. at 143 (“It is a necessary implication of the prescribed procedures [set 
out in Article V] that neither statute nor Constitution should be changed by judges.”). 
PANEL2.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
352 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:347 
Observer,23 are two people that I probably would have to deny ever 
meeting in my entire life.  That is because I am relatively conser-
vative and they have skewered virtually every politician with 
whom I have had a good relationship over the last five years.24  
Nonetheless, society would fall in about seven seconds if Wayne 
Barrett and Andrea Bernstein could not write because, no matter 
what reforms you introduce for campaign finance, the people who 
are voting on those laws are living off that money.  Politicians use 
campaign finance to pay for their girlfriends, clothes, restaurant 
bills, and the hotel rooms where they meet their girlfriends. 
There are a million other ways that people get paid back for 
making campaign contributions.25  You give them free legal ad-
 
23. Andrea Bernstein covers New York State politics for the New York Observer 
and also writes for other popular publications, such as the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Post.  See Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The 
Lord of the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw; The Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can 
Evade, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3; Andrea Bernstein, Pataki’s Secrets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at A21. 
24. See, e.g., Wayne Barrett, Giuliani For Sale, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 7, 1998, at 25 
(discussing New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani (“Mayor Giuliani”)); Wayne 
Barrett, Fifty Reasons to Loathe Your Mayor, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 4, 1997 (same); 
Wayne Barrett, State For Sale:  How Pataki’s Secret Auction Attracted Conflict Contri-
butions, VILLAGE VOICE, May 7, 1996, at 12 (discussing New York Governor George 
Pataki); Wayne Barrett, Taking a Pass on Peace:  The Rabin Rant of Rudy’s Rabbis, 
VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 12, 1995 (discussing Mayor Giuliani); Wayne Barrett, Grand Old 
Pals:  The Political Rapsheet of Rudy’s Brooklyn Party Animal, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 
26, 1995, at 13 (same); Wayne Barrett & Jon Bowles, A D.A. Gone Bad:  How Albany 
Ambitions Corrupted Joe Hynes, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 30, 1994 (discussing Joe Hynes); 
Andrea Bernstein, Why Albany Can’t Shun Controversy, NEWSDAY, Jan. 4, 1998, at B5 
(discussing New York State politicians working in Albany, New York’s capital); Andrea 
Bernstein, A State Budget of Smoke and Mirrors, NEWSDAY, Aug. 10, 1997, at G5 
(same); Andrea Bernstein, A Cold, Cold Feeling Inside Albany, NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 1997, 
at G5 (same); Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The Lord of 
the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw; The Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can Evade, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3 (same); Andrea Bernstein, Once Again, A State Budget 
Mess, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1996, at A45 (same); Andrea Bernstein, Pataki’s Secrets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at A21 (discussing New York Governor George Pataki). 
25. See Council of Favors; Lords of Their Wards, Aldermen are Generous to a 
Fault-With Taxpayer’s Money.  The Gift-Giving Translates into Votes and Campaigns 
Contributions, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997, at N1; George E. Jordan & Michael Powell, The 
Buddy System is Rudy’s Too; Mayor’s Hiring Freeze Thawed to Accommodate Pals and 
Kin, NEWSDAY, Apr. 18, 1994, at A6; Liam Pleven & Robert E. Kessler, Feds Probe Pa-
taki’s 1994 Fundraising/Sources:  Focus on Possible Promised Favors, NEWSDAY, Jan. 
22, 1998, at A26; David E. Rosenbaum, In Political Money Game, the Year of Big 
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vice.  When some judge gets in trouble, you get appointed to inves-
tigate him and throw the investigation into the toilet.  There are a 
million ways to benefit from making campaign contributions. 
So if you are asking me for my opinion about the most impor-
tant issue regarding campaign finance reform, it is allowing the 
views of Wayne Barrett on the left, the American Spectator on the 
right, and the New York Times for noblesse oblige in the middle to 
be heard. 
The biggest problem that we have now, is the business with 
soft money and hard money.26  Politicians find ways to collect 
large sums of money for which they do not have to disclose the 
source and there is not a campaign cap.27  The absolute champion 
of that, God bless him, is Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-New 
York).28  He collects very large sums of money and then transfers 
it back to the local republican parties.29 
Look at President Clinton.  The Democratic Party in New York 
is dying; it is hard to believe, but it is really in trouble.30  President 
 
Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at A1; Bob Sablatura, The Other Government; 
Contractual Friendships; Thin Line Separates Political Giving and Quid Pro Quo, HOUS. 
CHRON., Mar. 24, 1998, at A1. 
26. See 144 CONG. REC. H1726 (1998); see also Hearings on Campaign Finance 
Revision:  Soft Money Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 104th 
Cong. 1 (1997) (testimony of Bradley A. Smith, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute; Anthony 
Corrado, Giving, Spending and “Soft Money”, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 45 (1997). 
27. See Art Buchwald, Hard Facts About Soft Money, WASH. POST, July 4, 1996, at 
C1; James Dao, Pataki Will Not Open Books on Inaugural Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
1995, at A1; Ernie Freda, On Washington; Disaster-Relief Bill Heading For Certain 
Veto, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 6, 1997, at A8; Disclosure Best Reform of Soft-Money 
Financing, SEATTLE TIMES, June 25, 1997, at B4; David E. Rosenbaum, In Political 
Money Game, the Year of Big Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at A1. 
28. See Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The Lord of 
the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw, The Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can Evade, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3; Howard Kurtz, Raging Al, WASH. POST, May 22, 
1994, at W10. 
29. See Andrea Bernstein, A Look at Roadblocks to Campaign Reform; The Lord of 
the Loopholes; Any Law You Can Draw, the Likes of Wily Al D’Amato Can Evade, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at C3; Kurtz, supra note 28, at W10; Leslie Wayne, Republi-
can Rainmaker—A Special Report; D’Amato Converted Donations to Help New York 
Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at A1. 
30. See Richard L. Berke, Democratic Party Unable to Pay Debts from Last Year’s 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A1; Richard L. Berke, Democrats’ Big Debt 
Hurts Effort in Three Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A28; Tom Precious, State 
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Clinton has taken all the money out of the state of New York.31  
The Democratic Party of New York is screaming on the front page 
of the New York Times that the Democratic National Party is col-
lecting their share.32  Well, the reason for that is the Democrats are 
not in power in New York State,33 so they no longer have access to 
the goodies to give to contributors.  A large Democratic contribu-
tor cannot go to the Governor and get a road contract or have ad-
vantageous judges appointed.  So President Clinton comes in and 
collects all of the money. 
The difference between soft and hard money is wrong.  It en-
ables people who can accumulate a lot of money to make essen-
tially surreptitious contributions.34  So the absolute essence of all 
of this is disclosure.  I think that if you are rich and you want to 
give a lot of money to a politician, so long as everybody knows 
about it, go ahead and do it.  The election is still based on the ma-
jority of votes.  Unions and other special interest groups in this 
country will find a way to offset those large contributions of 
money. 
You cannot have secret contributions, and you also cannot have 
disguised contributions.  A disguised contribution would be where 
some people in Indonesia decide to give money to advance the in-
 
Democrats are Hard at Work Rebuilding Party, TIMES UNION, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1; 
Adam Nagourney, New York State’s Democrats See Party Adrift and Divided, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 1997, at A1; Adam Nagourney, Consensus Proves Elusive For Democratic 
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at A51. 
31. See Adam Nagourney, Democratic National Party to Share Wealth with States, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1998, at B4; Adam Nagourney, Fight Widens Over Keeping Party 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at B1. 
32. See Adam Nagourney & James Dao, As Clinton Eats Up Contributions, New 
York Party Says It’s Starving, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at A1; Adam Nagourney, De-
mocratic National Party to Share Wealth with States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1998, at B4; 
Adam Nagourney, Fight Widens Over Keeping Party Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, 
at B1. 
33. See Precious, supra note 30, at A1; see also Robert J. McCarthy, State Democ-
rats Meet to Discuss Plan on How to Regain Power in New York, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 
30, 1997, at B6; Adam Nagourney, New York State’s Democrats See Party Adrift and 
Divided, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at A2. 
34. See Color of Money; End the Abuse; McCain-Feingold is Dead, and With It, 
Hopes For Campaign-Finance Reform, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 3, 1998, at B8; Saundra 
Smokes, End the Scam of Soft Money Campaign Contributions, SYRACUSE HERALD AM., 
Feb. 23, 1997, at G3. 
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terests of people in China.  I still do a lot of criminal defense work, 
so I can tell you, if you represent any Chinese gangsters, they will 
tell you that they can go home to China and nobody will be able to 
get them.  The Chinese gangsters, in some areas, run the banks, the 
government, and the police.35  So, with a disguised contribution 
you do not know whose interests are being served; that is why it is 
a problem. 
Those foreign contributors to President Clinton are on the run 
and cannot be located36 because they are in China.  They will not 
turn up, and China will not give them back unless they want to.  In 
return for hiding out the main witnesses against President Clinton 
in China, someone, somewhere paid a price.  Actually, you paid 
for that indirectly.  I am not saying President Clinton is any differ-
ent than the Republicans—there are lots of bad things you could 
say about them too.  But here, somebody made a power tradeoff. 
In short, the essence of what I am saying is two things.  First, 
everything they tell you in law school about the law and the impar-
tiality of the judiciary is lovely, but it is not true.  As a lawyer, you 
should look for things that go wrong, for partiality, and for unfair 
influence. 
Second, campaign contributions are a double-edged sword be-
cause contributions enable people to express their opinions and in-
fluence government—hopefully for the better, but possibly for the 
worse. 
The most important thing is disclosure.  Interestingly enough, 
in the practice of law, it is what people do not tell you which is the 
most upsetting and often causes the most injustice. 
MR. BARRET: Thank you very much.  Our next panelist to 
speak is Erik Joerss of Common Cause. 
 
35. See Daniel Kwan, Warning as Crime Gangs Take Control, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, Sept. 17, 1996; Jane H. Lii, Chinese Immigrant Flees an Asian Smug-
gling Gang a Second Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at B1; Sam Meddis, Chinese 
Gangs:  USA’s ‘New Mafia?’, USA TODAY, July 11, 1990, at A1. 
36. See, e.g., Indictments Bolster Contentions of Foreign Influence Peddling, 
OMAHA-WORLD HERALD, Feb. 21, 1998, at 34 (stating that Charlie Trie, who was in-
dicted by a federal grand jury on fifteen counts of campaign finance violations in connec-
tion with the Clinton-Gore campaign, disappeared from the United States and was 
thought to be hiding in China). 
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MR. JOERSS: I would like to start by saying that what Mr. 
Hayes just said about Andrea Bernstein is completely true.  As a 
matter of fact, Common Cause is honoring her on Friday for the 
work she has done over the past year.37 
It is really an honor to be here.  Looking at the other panelists, 
it is even more of an honor.  I feel a bit overwhelmed. 
I want to talk a little bit about Buckley v. Valeo,38 in that the 
key to Buckley, according to the justices, was that you can limit 
contributions only if Congress can show a compelling interest, 
such as corruption or the appearance of corruption.39  In Buckley, 
the Court decided that Congress could limit contributions in order 
to eliminate corruption.40  The Court held, however, that Congress 
could not limit spending, because the Court did not see the same 
link between spending and corruption.41 
We see now, twenty-two years later, that the system has cre-
ated a hybrid42 where it has ignored basic supply-and-demand 
rules.  Although the decision has lead to an unquenchable thirst for 
campaign dollars because campaign spending is not restricted, 
there are limited ways to raise this money.43  This has fostered 
much of the illegality and the underground contributions that we 
presently see.44 
If the Court looked at Buckley now, twenty-two years later, it 
would see that the current system is unworkable, partly because we 
 
37. See Judge Sets Sights on Old Seat, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 19, 1998, 
at B2. 
38. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
39. Id. at 26-29, 58. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. at 45-47, 53. 
42. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1997). 
43. See generally, No More Loophole to Avoid Special Counsel, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 
7, 1997, at 2 (discussing restrictions on raising “hard money” contributions). 
44. See William Booth, California Rep. Kim, Wife Charged in Campaign Donation 
Scheme, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at A16; Art Buchwald, Hard Facts About Soft 
Money, WASH. POST, July 4, 1996, at C1; James Dao, Pataki Will Not Open Books on 
Inaugural Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A1; Firm Faces Charges of Illegal Dona-
tions, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), May 16, 1997, at E1; Freda, supra note 27; Jerry Se-
per, Lobbyist Gets Fine, Probation in Illegal Espy-Case Donation, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1998, at A2. 
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do need spending caps in order to limit the role that money plays in 
our political system. 
The Buckley Court equated money with free speech.45  It 
pointed out that advertising is the key instrument used by candi-
dates to get their messages out.46  The Court ignored such things as 
debates, candidate forums, and panel discussions.47  All of which 
are generally more substantive than a thirty-second sound bite in a 
television advertisement that attacks competitors and does not ad-
vance any views. 
So we are left with a system where money, as Mr. Hayes just 
said, is the measure of a candidacy and how seriously a candidate 
is taken.  Right now, the race that we will see with Alfonse 
D’Amato against Geraldine Ferraro48 or Mark Green49 or Charles 
Schumer50 is expected to cost somewhere around $40 to $45 mil-
lion.51  Senator D’Amato is expected to spend well over $20 mil-
lion;52 he already has well over $12 million in his campaign 
chest.53  There is talk that Geraldine Ferraro might not be the right 
 
45. In Buckley, the Court stated that: 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expres-
sion by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their explora-
tion, and the size of the audience reached.  This is because virtually every 
means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure 
of money. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). 
46. See id. at 26. 
47. See id.  Although the Court ignored debates, forums, and panel discussions, it 
did recognize speeches and rallies as expensive approaches for political candidates to 
convey their messages.  See id. 
48. Former U.S. Representative (D-New York); 1984 Democratic vice presidential 
candidate. 
49. Public Advocate for the City of New York. 
50. U.S. Representative (D-New York) 
51. See Marie Cocco, Get It While It’s Hot—the $50-Million Senate Seat, 
NEWSDAY, July 17, 1997, at A49; Joel Siegel, Campaigns Adopt Art of the Dial, DAILY 
NEWS, Feb. 15, 1998, at 51; James Toedtman, First Bucks, Then Ballots, NEWSDAY, Jan. 
11, 1998, at A24. 
52. See Robert Gavin, D’Amato Polishing Image For Election, POST-STANDARD 
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Mar. 24, 1998, at A4 (estimating cost of New York campaign to exceed 
$30 million). 
53. Compare Marc Humbert, D’Amato Keeps Lead in Raising Donations, TIMES 
UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan. 31, 1998, at B2 (estimating that D’Amato has raised $12.2 
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person to run against him simply because she has not raised 
enough money yet and she may not have the ability to do so.54  
Mark Green, who has arguably a very, very strong record, has only 
raised $1 million.55  Now, although $1 million may seem like a lot 
of money, in state politics it is a pittance.  It is enough to ensure 
that Mark Green will probably be the first one out of the race.  
Charles Schumer, who has raised $8 to $9 million at this point, is 
most likely to be a successful candidate—and it is not based on his 
record; it is based on the fact that he was able to raise this money.56 
So we have candidates whose expertise is not necessarily on is-
sues.  We have candidates whose expertise is not necessarily in 
representing the people.  Fund-raising prowess is the major skill 
that a candidate needs right now to run for office.57  I do not think 
it is terribly difficult to see how destructive that is. 
In the last election cycle, it was estimated that the average Sen-
ate seat went for $4.5 million.58  So, from their first week in office 
until they are out, Senators have to raise $15,000 every single 
week.  This also takes away from the job that politicians are sup-
posed to do for the public. 
I got involved with this issue working on Project Independence 
with Common Cause.  Project Independence started largely be-
cause two former Senators, Bill Bradley59 and Alan Simpson,60 
both walked away from the Senate citing the fact that fund-raising 
has obscured the reason why they actually wanted to serve the pub-
 
million), with Toedtman, supra note 51, at A24 (estimating that D’Amato raised $12.7 
million and has already spent $4.2 million). 
54. See Clifford J. Levy, Ferraro Says Fund-Raising Shows Her Strength, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at B5. 
55. See Humbert, supra note 53, at B2. 
56. See Gavin, supra note 52, at A4. 
57. See Toedtman, supra note 51, at A24; Can Ferraro Raise Enough To Win De-
mocratic Nomination, Run Against D’Amato?, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Jan. 29, 1998, 
available in West, WESTLAW, 1998 WL 5620770. 
58. See Toedtman, supra note 51, at A24; see also David S. Broder, Campaigns 
Without Shame, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at A21. 
59. See Clifford J. Levy, Bradley Says He Won’t Seek 4th Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 1995, at A1. 
60. See Joel Achenbach, Hi Ho, Simpson, Away! Roasts and Toasts for the Cowboy 
Senator, WASH. POST, May 22, 1996, at C1. 
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lic.61  So they started Project Independence.62 
Part of it was based on a poll in the New York Times, stating 
that nine out of ten people polled said that the campaign finance 
system is broken and in desperate need of repair—two out of ten 
thought that legislators might actually act on it.63  So again, be-
cause of our campaign fund raising system, our candidates are not 
as strong, we have low voter turnouts,64 and people feel less con-
nected with the system.65 
In Project Independence, which was largely a petition drive, 
there were 1 million signatures gathered around the country—
100,000 in New York State.66  A carload of them was dumped at 
Senator D’Amato’s office.  His campaign staff said they had never, 
ever gotten that many calls or letters on an issue before.  Yet he ig-
nored it.  He is basically still against the McCain-Feingold bill. 
The question is, if his constituents are clearly for it, what is his 
motivation for going against it?  He already has his war chest.  One 
could argue the motivation for going against it is that the party 
leadership, due to things like soft money and the way that the na-
tional parties are able to raise unlimited money, has a dispropor-
tionate amount of power.  If Sen. D’Amato decides to buck people 
like Senator McConnell67 or Senator Lott,68 he can be punished in 
the next election cycle.  A lot of the Republican soft money maybe 
will go to him, as it certainly will not go to people like John 
 
61. See Richard L. Berke, Bradley, in Retirement, Remains Coy on Presidency, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at A24. 
62. See Jonathan Riskind, Campaign Gift Reform Backed at Gathering, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, June 5, 1997, at A7; Former U.S. Senator Alan K. Simpson Elected To The 
Board Of Directors Of U.S. Energy Corp., PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 17, 1997. 
63. See Michael Lewis, A Question of Honor, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at F32 
(stating that the poll showed that “while 90% of the electorate say that money is corrupt-
ing politics, only 23% expect Congress to do anything about it”). 
64. See Darrel Rowland, Advocate of Campaign Reform Raises Big Bucks, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 12, 1997, at D2. 
65. See Jonathan Riskind, High-Dollar Campaigning, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 
1997, at D4. 
66. See Edwin Chen, A Hard March Through Campaign-Cash Jungle, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 13, 1997, at A14 (stating that one million signatures were obtained). 
67. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky). 
68. Senator Trent Lott (R-Mississippi). 
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McCain69 or Olympia Snowe,70 who right now support the 
McCain-Feingold bill.71 
Every presidential election cycle we hear that we are getting 
the lesser of two evils.72  It is not an empty refrain.  We are not the 
ones who really decide who is among the available choices for 
election.  This again relates to the fact that getting elected is about 
money, rather than skill and caring about issues. 
This is partly why we are here talking about Buckley.  In Buck-
ley, the Court acknowledged that there were fundamental problems 
with our campaign finance system.73  The Court, however, created 
this hybrid which actually exacerbated the problems.  I think the 
decision would be different if they looked at Buckley now.  If the 
Court did the fact finding today, they would find many corruptive 
influences.  For example, Amway, which is a direct marketing 
group, gave $1 million cash to the Republican Party in April of last 
year.74  In July of last year, a federal tax bill went through in which 
Amway received a $270 million tax break.75  This is, in my opin-
ion, the straight quid pro quo corruption that Congress and the 
Court sought to prevent.76  Yet, we see more and more illustrations 
of corruption—this is why reform is so necessary. 
 
69. Senator John McCain (R-Arizona). 
70. Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine). 
71. See Lewis, supra note 63, at F32. 
72. See Campaign Notebook:  Clinton Aides Begin Work Early on Second-Term 
Staff, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 6, 1996, at A12; David Goldberg, Skeptical Georgians Opt 
for Status Quo, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 6, 1996, at B7; How our Panelists Voted in 
Presidential Election, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1996, at A13. 
73. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (finding that the problem of campaign 
finance is not illusory). 
74. See Ruth Marcus, Common Cause Lists “Soft” Donors, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 
1998, at A23; John R. Wilke, Big GOP Donor Gets His Way in Bill Affecting Merger of 
Michigan Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at A16; see also Greg Hitt, Favored 
Companies Get 11th-Hour Breaks, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997, at A2. 
75. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (Aug. 5, 
1997) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West, WESTLAW through Pub.L. 
No. 105-165)); see also Clinton Prepares to Fire a Popgun at Giveaways, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 11, 1997, at A11; Michelle Malkin, We Have Ourselves to Blame for Beggars in 3-
Piece Suits, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at B4. 
76. See Federal Election Campaign Finance Reform:  Hearings on Campaign Fi-
nance before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 105th Cong. (1997); see also 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. 
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MR. BARRET: Thank you Mr. Joerss.  Our next presentation 
is from William Kastin, an attorney with the New York City Cam-
paign Finance Board. 
MR. KASTIN: Thank you. 
I want to start today by reading a quote of Charles Keating, the 
former operator of the failed Lincoln Savings & Loan.77  During 
the time period in which the Lincoln Savings & Loan was being 
investigated, Charles Keating raised more than $1.3 million for 
five United States Senators and their causes.78  This is what he had 
to say: 
“One question had to do with whether my financial support in 
any way influenced several political figures to take up my cause.  I 
want to say, in the most forceful way I can, I certainly hope so.”79 
Although this quote deals with campaign contributions and this 
panel is discussing spending limits, I think the quote is significant 
because it illustrates an important point in today’s political arena: 
money talks. 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckley that 
government-mandated expenditure limits violate the First Amend-
ment,80 wealthy citizens like Charles Keating are able to inject 
large amounts of money into political campaigns and causes.  In-
cumbents and challengers alike welcome such money, as there is 
no limit whatsoever on the amount of money politicians can spend. 
The Buckley Court’s holding does not completely prohibit 
spending limits.81  There is a footnote in the decision, footnote 65, 
which states that “Congress may engage in public financing of 
election campaigns and may condition the acceptance of public 
funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified ex-
 
77. See Lincoln S & L Lacks Sufficient Capital, Bank Board Says, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
23, 1988, § 1, at 7.. 
78. See Jill Abramson & Paul Duke, Jr., The Keating Five:  Senators Who Helped 
Lincoln S&L Now Face Threat to Their Careers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1989, at A1; 
Gramm’s Campaign Manager Counts GOP Support in Lake, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 
31, 1995, at 4. 
79. David J. Jefferson, Keating of American Continental Corp. Comes Out Fighting, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1989, § 2, at 2. 
80. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51. 
81. See id. at 57 n.65. 
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penditure limits.”82  In other words, if a candidate chooses to ac-
cept public funds, the government may establish a spending limit 
upon that candidate without violating the First Amendment.83 
New York City has one such program.  The Campaign Finance 
Board (“Board”) administers the Campaign Finance Program 
(“program”), which was established in 1988 following a series of 
scandals in New York City government.84  Those scandals focused 
public attention on the issue of influence over elected officials and 
whether such influence leads officials to act for private gain rather 
than for the public welfare.85 
The purpose of the Campaign Finance Act86 is to decrease the 
influence of private campaign contributions on candidates for New 
York City office.87  The Campaign Finance Act seeks to promote 
community-level fund-raising, enable serious candidates to run ef-
fective campaigns regardless of access to money, increase public 
understanding of local issues, and increase participation in local 
elections. 
The program is voluntary and is available to candidates who 
are running for the offices of mayor, public advocate, comptroller, 
borough president, or city council.88  Candidates who join the pro-
gram—called participating candidates—must abide by contribution 
and expenditure limits and provide disclosure of campaign activ-
 
82. Id. 
83. See id. 
84. New York City Campaign Finance Act, NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 
7, §§ 3-701 to 3-715.  See generally Jeffrey D. Friedlander, et al., The New York City 
Campaign Finance Act, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 345 (1988) (describing New York City’s 
campaign finance system); Is This the Best We Can Do? Regarding Tomorrow’s City 
Council Vote on an Historic Campaign Finance Reform, NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1988, at 48 
(discussing New York City’s campaign finance system). 
85. See Nicole A. Gordon, Campaign Finance Reform:  Life in the Trenches; The 
New York City Model:  Essentials for Effective Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 J.L. 
POL’Y 79 (1997) (citing political scandals in New York City during the 1980s as the im-
petus for various reforms including the Campaign Finance Act) [hereinafter Gordon I]; 
Michael C. Miller & Maranda E. Fritz, New York City’s Campaign Finance Laws, N.Y. 
L.J., June 17, 1993, at 1. 
86. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, §§ 3-701 to 3-715. 
87. See Nicole A. Gordon & Hyla P. Wagner, The New York City Campaign Fi-
nance Program:  A Reform that is Working, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605, 607-08 (1992). 
88. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE, tit. 3, ch. 7 § 3-703 (outlining eligibility and 
other requirements). 
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ity.89 
Participating candidates running for city-wide office must also 
participate in a series of debates.90  In return, candidates who dem-
onstrate sufficient public support and are opposed on the ballot can 
receive public matching funds.91  In addition, the Board monitors 
candidates’ compliance with the program92 and publishes the Voter 
Guide93 before each election, which gives the candidates an oppor-
tunity to present their views to the public.94 
The program’s expenditure limits are intended to curtail exces-
sive campaign spending and enhance public confidence in elected 
officials.  History indicates that, in certain instances, the public 
disapproves of candidates who fail to join the program.  For exam-
ple, in the 1989 mayoral election, candidate Ronald Lauder, who 
chose not to participate in the program, spent $13 million on his 
failed 1989 mayoral bid,95 but five major mayoral candidates who 
did join the program agreed to spend no more than $3.6 million.96 
Realistic spending limits reduce the public perception that elec-
tive offices are for sale and create a more level financial playing 
field on which all candidates, including challengers, can compete 
more meaningfully.97 
The program does recognize, however, that the spending limit 
could handicap a participant if the participant is facing a candidate 
who has not joined the program.  In those situations, the program 
 
89. See id. § 3-703(d), (f), (h). 
90. See id. § 3-709.5(1). 
91. See id. § 3-705(2) (discussing public financing). 
92. See id. § 3-710 (Board’s auditing powers). 
93. The Voter Guide, published by New York City’s Campaign Finance Board, 
helps inform voters about candidate positions.  See generally Laurence Laufer, Campaign 
Finance:  New York’s Campaign Finance Program for the 1997 City Elections:  A Look 
Ahead, 2 CITY LAW 101 (1996).  The guide is published in five languages and distributed 
to all registered voters.  See id. 
94. The Voter Guide provides each candidate with one page to present his or her 
views and qualifications.  See id. 
95. See Michael Weber, Primary ‘89 Now, The Real Fund Raising Stars, NEWSDAY, 
Sept. 13, 1989, at 36; see also Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 607-08. 
96. See Weber, supra note 95, at 36; see also Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 
611. 
97. See Gordon I, supra, note 85, at 83-84; George N. Spitz, New York Forum 
About Politics—Reform Money Still Talks, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 1990, at 62. 
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spending limit is removed when the non-participating candidate 
has raised or spent more than one half the expenditure limit,98 of 
$30,000 in the case of the city council. 
In addition, the Board realizes that during a political campaign 
there may be expenditures made on behalf of a candidate by an in-
dividual entity not connected with the campaign.99  In those situa-
tions, the expenditures, which are referred to as independent ex-
penditures, are not subject to the spending limit, as long as the 
participant did not in fact authorize, request, or cooperate with the 
expenditures in any way.100 
Based on the ten years of the program and the three election 
cycles in which the Board has administered the program, there are 
nine observations I would like to make about spending limits and 
the First Amendment.  Naturally, the numbers that I reference will 
continue to change as candidates continue to file. 
First, despite First Amendment concerns, history indicates that 
a majority of candidates choose to join the voluntary program and 
are willing to abide by spending limits.101  For example, in the 
1997 primary election, 81% of the candidates on the ballot chose to 
join the program.  In the general election, 55% of the candidates on 
the ballot joined the program.  In 1997, 71% of all incumbents 
joined the program.102  Those numbers are even higher when look-
ing at candidates who are considered competitive candidates.  Con-
sider also the 1996 Senate race in Massachusetts, where Republi-
can Governor William Weld and Democratic Senator John Kerry 
agreed to limit their expenditures to $6.9 million.103 
What those numbers indicate is that, while not every candidate 
chooses to agree to abide by spending limits, the claim that a can-
didate’s freedom of speech is actually impeded by the imposition 
 
98. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, § 3-706(3). 
99. See id. § 3-702(8) (defining the term “contribution”). 
100. See id.; Miller & Fritz, supra note 85, at 1 n.18-20. 
101. See Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 623-25. 
102. Program participation rates and participants’ campaign finance data are avail-
able at the offices of the campaign finance board. 
103. See Frank Phillips, Deal to Limit Spending Breaks Down, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
24, 1996, at A1.  But see Max Frankel, Words & Image:  Target the Tube, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 1, 1996, § 6, at 42 (stating that, ultimately, even they went over the limit). 
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of spending limits may be mere speculation.  Rather, candidates 
are willing to abide by spending limits in competitive political 
races without experiencing a threat to their freedom of speech.104 
The second point is that spending limits must be set at an 
amount high enough for all candidates running for a particular of-
fice to maintain effective campaigns.105  For example, spending 
limits set for the city council elections must account for the high-
est-spending race in all city council districts.  After each election, 
the spending limits must be fine-tuned to reflect the most recent 
spending patterns.106 
One point to keep in mind is that, because reform is an ongoing 
process, it is important for the spending limits to be re-examined 
after each election to make sure that candidates are subject to a fair 
limit that will not violate their rights.107 
Third, there is ample evidence that a public financing system 
with spending limits, as referred to in the footnote in Buckley,108 
does work.  An analysis of spending by candidates who partici-
pated in the program in 1997 clearly indicates that few candidates 
approached the spending limit for their particular offices.  For ex-
ample, the spending limit in 1997 for a New York City borough 
president candidate was $2.3 million.  Twelve borough president 
candidates participated in the program.  Only two candidates out of 
the twelve spent more than $1 million, and no candidate spent 
more than approximately $1.8 million. 
Similar results were found in the city council elections, in 
which 138 candidates participated in the program and the spending 
limit was $288,000.  Of the 138 candidates, only a few candidates 
 
104. See generally Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fundrais-
ing:  Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994) (analyzing campaign spending limits in light of the First 
Amendment). 
105. See Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 618-21. 
106. In New York City, the spending limits are adjusted each election cycle to re-
flect changes in the Consumer Price Index.  See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN CODE § 3-
706(1)(e). 
107. See Gordon & Wagner, supra note 87, at 617; Nicole A. Gordon, The New 
York City Model:  Essentials for Effective Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 
79, 89 (1997). 
108. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976). 
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spent more than $200,000 and no candidate came within $10,000 
of the combined spending limit.  One notable candidate who did 
approach the spending limit in the 1997 elections was New York 
City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani.109 
The Campaign Finance Board has never received a complaint 
from a participating candidate that he or she was unable to run an 
effective campaign due to the amount of the spending limit.  The 
claim that the program spending limits have the effect of hamper-
ing a candidate’s ability to communicate his or her ideas is simply 
without merit. 
Fourth, some commentators have claimed that spending limits 
hinder a challenger from mounting an effective campaign against 
an incumbent.110  But the last three city elections for mayor do not 
support this proposition, as a challenger defeated the incumbent in 
two of the last three elections.111  Moreover, there is no evidence 
that the sole exception—the 1997 election—was due to the spend-
ing limit hindering the challenger.  Rather, it was more likely the 
result of the general competitiveness between the two major candi-
dates.112 
Fifth, numerous candidates have indicated that spending limits 
actually enhance speech, as they prohibit wealthy candidates from 
 
109. See Robert Polner, Mayor Admits Illegal Donations, NEWSDAY, Sept. 13, 1997, 
at A3 (reporting that the Giuliani campaign had raised $8.6 million by mid-September 
1997); cf. Clifford J. Levy, Rules Stiffened for Spending on Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, July 
7, 1997, at B1 (reporting that 27 donors who had contributed the maximum allowable to 
the Giuliani campaign were able to funnel more funds into the Giuliani campaign through 
“soft money” contributions to the New York state Republican Party). 
110. See, e.g., FRANK SORAUF, JR., MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 179 (1988) 
(concluding that caps harm rather than enhance competition); Joel M. Gora, Campaign 
Finance Reform:  Still Searching for a Better Way, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 151 (1997) (stat-
ing that severe limits make it harder for challengers to raise money and that the disparity 
is greater because incumbents have free means of communications). 
111. See William Bunch, et al., Election ‘93 a Rudy Makeover, NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 
1993 (reporting Giuliani’s victory over Dinkins in the 1993 mayoral race); Rick Hamp-
son, Now Comes the Hard Part for New York’s New Mayor, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4, 
1993, available in West, WESTLAW 1993 WL 5597131; Frank Lynn, The New York 
Primary:  Dinkins Sweeps Past Koch for Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1989 at A1. 
112. Cf. CNN Special Event:  Elections (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 4, 1997) 
(discussing the two major candidates). 
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drowning out candidates with less financial resources.113  Thus, 
spending limits can provide more candidates with an opportunity 
to participate in competitive races, thereby widening the field of 
participants to those who otherwise could not viably run due to a 
lack of resources. 
Sixth, a spending cap also influences contributions.114  If a can-
didate is limited in the amount of money he or she can spend, the 
candidate will not need to amass contributions from as large a pool 
of donors.  Therefore, by imposing reasonable spending limits, the 
amount of contributions a candidate collects, and the prospect of 
undue influence and corruption as a result thereof, are minimized. 
Seventh, one should also consider the role government can play 
in expanding political speech.115  New York City, for example, re-
cently adopted a local law providing that, candidates running for 
citywide office who join the program and appear on the ballot must 
participate in a series of debates.116  Thus, in addition to receiving 
the benefit of public funds, candidates have an opportunity to ap-
pear before the voters and present their opinions at no cost to their 
campaigns. 
Similarly, the Voter Guide,117 which is published by the Board 
before each election, gives candidates the opportunity to present 
their views to the public.118  Those are examples of campaign fi-
 
113. Cf. Tim Curran, Campaign Reform Becomes Hottest Game on Hill; Boren 
Moves to Restrict Lobbying, ROLL CALL, Jan. 25, 1993 (discussing Senator Ernest Holl-
ings statements about campaign spending). 
114. See Gora, supra note 110, at 162.  But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-46 
(1976) (rejecting the argument that spending caps are necessary because they prevent 
contributors from sidestepping the contribution limits by paying directly for advertise-
ments or other campaign activities); cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conserva-
tive Political Action Comm’n, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1958) (stating that “elected officials 
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial 
gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns”). 
115. See, e.g., Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws:  
Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 59 (1987) (discussing 
the government’s role in regulating campaign finance and the effects on speech). 
116. See NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, ch. 7, § 3-709.5.  The program is vol-
untary in that candidates who elect not to join forgo public money. 
117. See supra, notes 93-94 (describing the Voter Guide).. 
118. See supra notes 93-94 (explaining how candidates use the Voter Guide to pre-
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nance reform in which action by the government augments speech 
rather than hampers it. 
Eighth, the program’s history indicates that a large percentage 
of campaigns in New York City are driven by the cost of media 
and mailings.119  In 1997, for example, seven of the top ten ven-
dors used by participants were related to political mailings or the 
media.120  In 1993, approximately forty percent of all expenditures, 
or $14.2 million, was spent on advertising and campaign mail-
ings.121  By providing free television time for candidates or subsi-
dizing mailings, the overall cost of campaigns could be diminished 
and spending limits would not have the same negative connotation 
they may have to some candidates.122 
Lastly, at the federal level, spending on political campaigns has 
reached monumental heights.123  In fact, the New York Times re-
cently estimated that it takes at least $5 million to run a successful 
Senate campaign, and in some states as much as $30 million, and 
that a House seat can cost $2 million.124 
One needs to question the quality of candidates running for a 
political office when only those with immense fortunes or access 
thereto are able to run effective campaigns.  Look at the recent ex-
 
sent their views to the public). 
119. See Philip Lentz, Robust Spending in ‘97 Elections Bolsters Vendors:  Con-
sultants, Hotels Among Big Winners as NYC Politicians Pay Out $36 Million, CRAIN’S 
N.Y. BUS., Mar. 16, 1998. 
120. See generally id. (discussing budget allocations). 
121. See  1 NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, ON THE ROAD TO REFORM:   
CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS 40 (1994) [hereinafter ROAD 
TO REFORM] (reporting that “[c]itywide candidates put more money into advertising than 
anything else, and the biggest chunk of advertising dollars was spent on television”). 
122. Cf. Janet E. Williams & Suzanne McBride, Funding From Special Interest 
Group Pays for a Lot More Than Just Getting Elected, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 10, 
1997, at A1 (quoting Representative David Frizzel); see also McCain-Feingold Bill, S. 
25, 105th Cong. (1997). 
123. See Allison Mitchell, Senate Resumes Debate on Campaign Financing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at A17; see also Lawrence M. O’Rourke, Impact of “Soft Money” 
Brings Call for Reform, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 26, 1997, at A1; Michael Posner, Con-
gressional Campaign Spending Smashes Record, REUTERS NA WIRE, Dec. 21, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ACRNWS File. 
124. See Max Frankel, Word & Image:  TV Remedy for a TV Malady, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 1996, at 36. 
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amples of Ross Perot,125 Steve Forbes,126 and, in California, Mi-
chael Huffington.127  In 1994, Huffington spent $28 million of his 
own money in a narrow loss to Senator Diane Feinstein.128  In the 
1996 presidential primary race, Steve Forbes spent $4 million in 
Arizona alone, approximately four times as much as Senator Bob 
Dole, and prevailed.129 
This pattern of high spending has emerged on the local level as 
well.130  In the 1993 race for City Council in Council District 4 on 
the Upper East Side of Manhattan, the incumbent Andrew Eristoff 
did not participate in the program, but he spent almost $624,000 in 
the general election, or about $26.54 per vote received.  His oppo-
nent spent $228,000, or about $9.77 per vote.131  In 1997, Andrew 
Eristoff ran a similar campaign. 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”132  Those words do not 
mean that any restriction on speech is unconstitutional, as such an 
interpretation would prevent laws against fraud and blackmail.133  
Admittedly, expenditure caps limit the quantity of political speech, 
as when a wealthy politician is prevented from broadcasting as 
 
125. See, e.g., David Lauter, Perot Spent Nearly $400,000 in March Funding:  Most 
of it Was His Own Money, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at 12; see also David Morgan, 
Gingrich Calls Wealthy Campaigners America’s No. 1 Problem, REUTERS NA WIRE, Jan. 
27, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. 
126. See id.; see also David C. Johnston, Mr. Forbes’s Modest Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 10, 1996, at D5. 
127. See Todd S. Purdum, California Governor’s Race:  A New Height in Spending, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at A1; see also Posner, supra note 123. 
128. See Purdum, supra note 127, at A1; Posner, supra note 123. 
129. See B. Drummond Ayres, Arizona; Rare Chance in a Contest Too Close to 
Predict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at A18; Jodi Enda & Steven Thomma, Forbes Wins 
in Arizona; Dole Takes Dakotas; GOP Race Thrown Into Further Turmoil; Doubts 
Mounting About Senate Leader’s Viability, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 28, 1996, at 
A1. 
130. Cf. Ken Fireman, Long Island Politics High Prices:  Campaign Spending on 
the Rise, NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1996, at A1 (discussing the rise in campaign spending for 
local positions on Long Island); see Sam H. Verhovek, Perot as a Political Presence:  
1992 All Over Again?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at A10. 
131. See ROAD TO REFORM, supra note 121, at 87; Newest Council Member Unsure 
If He Will Recoup $250,000 Campaign Loan, UPI, Mar. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, ACRNWS File. 
132. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
133. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 481 (1985). 
PANEL2.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
370 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:347 
many advertisements as he or she would like, the sum total of ad-
vertisements is less. 
But what is the result?  Have democracies that reasonably re-
strict electoral expenses suffered from a lack of knowledge about 
candidates and issues?  Do we want a system where qualified can-
didates are prevented from seeking office because they lack the re-
sources and access to immense amounts of money?  Instituting 
spending limits levels the playing field and provide more candi-
dates with the possibility of waging a competitive campaign. 
The Buckley decision held that imposing mandatory spending 
limits on a candidate impinges on free speech.134  Regrettably, the 
real speech issue today as a result of the Buckley decision is that 
money talks. 
MR. BARRET: Thank you Mr. Kastin.  Mr. Kayser is next.  
He is a partner in the New York City law firm of Kayser & Red-
fern 
MR. KAYSER: Thank you.  I would like to thank the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for 
giving me a chance to speak today. 
I have practiced law here in New York City for about twenty-
seven years.  I had been politically dormant for about thirty years, 
until a friend of mine, George Pataki, thought he might have an 
opportunity to beat and unseat an incumbent governor: Mario Cu-
omo. 
I have known George Pataki since he was about eighteen years 
old.  I spoke to him and thought that maybe he should make a race 
for the governorship.  As no one knew who he was at the time, I 
offered to help him raise some money—he didn’t have any—to 
make it possible for him to make the race.  Later, the party leader-
ship gave him support;135 then he won the party nomination136 and 
 
134. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976). 
135. See James Dao, The 1994 Campaign:  Pataki In a Fury of Campaigning, Can-
didates Pursue Last Minute Votes; Pataki and his Party, From L.I. to Albany, Show a 
United Front, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at A49. 
136. See David Bauder, Pataki Wins Conservatives’ Backing Gubernatorial Pri-
mary is Set, RECORD (N.J.), June 5, 1994, at A6; James Dao, Conservatives Choose Pa-
taki for Governor, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1994, at A42. 
PANEL2.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
1998] SYMPOSIUM—POLITICAL CAMPAIGN SPENDING CAPS 371 
later was elected.  So I have been active for the last three years 
helping him raise money and I have seen the system from that per-
spective. 
I am also a constitutional lawyer who has been involved in 
First Amendment issues.  I was involved in the ACLU’s opposition 
to the government petition for Supreme Court review in United 
States v. Progressive, Inc.,137 in which the government tried to re-
strict the publication of instructions for making a hydrogen bomb: 
even though that information was already in the public sphere. 
I also have written in the area of campaign finance.  I think 
there needs to be reform in the current law, just like the Common 
Cause speaker Erik Joerss believes.  Common Cause has examined 
this issue for a long time.  A number of years ago, a fellow named 
Fred Wertheimer, proposed the statute that the Buckley v. Valeo 
reviewed.138 
In that case, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the 
First Amendment and found that there is a direct correlation be-
tween money and access to speech.139  Now, is there anyone who 
thinks that the government can restrict the number of pamphlets 
you can print and circulate in an election, which would be a direct 
restriction on printing and distribution for political purposes?  Can 
the government restrict how many advertisements you can buy in 
the free market on the radio or television?  Can the government re-
strict any other way of reaching people?  Doesn’t the First 
Amendment protect us against that?  The United States Supreme 
Court found that there is a direct correlation between money and 
 
137. 467 F. Supp. 990, dismissed as moot, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).  The fed-
eral government voluntarily withdrew its petition for certiorari prior to consideration by 
the Supreme Court. 
138. See Dierde Shesgreen, Campaign Finance Reform Movement Gathers Momen-
tum, TEXAS LAW., Nov. 3, 1997, at 4; Edwin M. Yoder, Reform an Oxymoron to Cam-
paign Cash, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 9, 1996, at 34.  Fred Wertheimer is head of De-
mocracy 21 and is President of Common Cause.  He has given testimony on honoraria 
and salary levels for top-level government officials before Congressional committees.  
See Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress:  Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 
487. 
139. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 26, & 266 (White, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) (stating that “[o]ne of the points on which all Members of the Court agree is 
that money is essential for effective communication in a political campaign”). 
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the ability to reach people.140  In fact, there is a consensus there.141 
To try to overrule that proposition, to argue that way—and I 
have heard a couple of people argue that way—is the same as try-
ing to overrule Roe v. Wade142 on abortion.  The debate is over.  It 
is settled law that the government has to stay out of certain areas of 
decisions with respect to reproductive issues,143 and the govern-
ment cannot prevent parties or individuals from spending as much 
money as they can raise or choose to spend in legitimate purposes 
for propagating ideas.144  That will not change.  So anyone who is 
advocating legislation which is premised upon the law changing in 
that area is whistling Dixie in New York City. 
Now, also there is a relationship between money and success.  
Ron Lauder was mentioned earlier, he was on the Conservative 
Party line and ran for mayor spending $13 million or some large 
amount.145  Did Ron Lauder expect to be elected mayor on the 
Conservative Party line in New York City?  I think he got about 
two percent of the vote or something like that;146 it was a small 
vote.  The answer is no. 
During that race he discussed term limits for city government, 
 
140. See id. 
141. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 266, with Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1319 
n.6 (1st Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with the Court in Buckley, but admitting that “virtually 
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of 
money”).  See also Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment:  The 
Case of American Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1357 (1994). 
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
143. See generally Robert A. Sedlerfn, The Constitution and Personal Autonomy:  
The Lawyering Perspective, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 773, 787 (1994) (stating that the 
Court’s decisions “make[] it clear, as the Court affirmed in Roe v. Wade, that reproduc-
tive freedom is a fundamental right, so that any interference with reproductive freedom 
must be tested under the exacting compelling governmental interest standard of review”); 
Loye M. Barton, The Policy Against Federal Funding for Abortions Extends Into the 
Realm of Free Speech After Rust v. Sullivan, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 637 (1992) (noting that 
abortion is a settled issue). 
144. See Gora, supra note 110, at 140-68 (arguing against government intervention 
in campaign finance). 
145. Ron Lauder ultimately spent $14.2 million.  See Frank Lynn, Giuliani Reports 
$200,000 Loan From the GOP, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1989, § 1, at 27. 
146. See Sam Roberts, Dinkins Defeats Giuliani in a Close Race; Wilder Seems 
Virginia Winner, Florio In; Voters, 5-4, Approve New York Charter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1989, at A1. 
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city council, and the mayor.147  Everybody else running for mayor 
had no interest in discussing term limits.  But he was propagating 
an idea.  Well, it went to a referendum in the City of New York 
twice so far, and it has won twice, and Ron Lauder is the man re-
sponsible for that based on the money he spent to get out that idea.  
The political establishment in New York City hates it, but that is 
the power of leaving campaign spending unlimited. 
Now, if you cannot cap spending, you need to find some other 
means of reform because the current law does not work.  I am for 
campaign finance reform.  I would like to see stricter disclosure 
requirements.  I would like to see tight, high criminal penalties for 
violation of those disclosure requirements.  The disclosure must be 
rapid so that the press can inform the electorate about contribu-
tions.  I agree with my fellow panelist Ed Hayes entirely that dis-
closure is the remedy for this problem because of the anomalies 
under this hybrid situation.  But because you cannot cap expendi-
tures—it is equivalent to free speech—you are left with limiting 
contributions.148  I also think that if the United States Supreme 
Court were to review again the statute that Buckley reviewed, the 
contribution limit, $1,000 per person for a candidate for federal of-
fice,149 would be overturned. 
So the campaign finance reform that I advocate is repeal of the 
substantial portion of the present statute.  That is, repeal of the 
provisions that establish any limitation on contributions or expen-
ditures—which are not successful anyway—and full disclosure.  
That would be real reform and would simplify the situation. 
What do you say when someone maintains that somebody is 
going to give too much money to a candidate and have too much 
influence?  Well, disclosure takes care of knowing where those in-
terests lay.  And if you do not have the limits, you have competing 
 
147. See Kevin Flynn & Ellis Henican, Voter’s Guide ‘89, NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1989, 
at 4; Doug Ireland, Clean Out the Vote, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 17, 1998, at 26; Steven L. 
Meyers, The 1993 Elections:  New York City Roundup; Vallone Says Term Limits Issue Is 
Not Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1993, at B2. 
148. See Michael J. Klapman, Majoritarian Judicial Review:  The Entrenchment 
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 511 (1997). 
149. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 608(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998) (providing that “no per-
son shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal of-
fice which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000”). 
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interests in our society.  We have competition in the marketplace 
of ideas.  That is what the United States stands for; that is what has 
made us great.  The First Amendment protects us from those con-
trols, and competition for ideas can take the form of money too.  
There are enough good people in our society who would support 
valid, bona fide change. 
That is my position, and I think it is the best position in light of 
the First Amendment of the United States. 
MR. BARRET: Thank you.  Next is Mark Lopez, an attorney 
with the American Civil Liberties Union at the national office in 
New York City. 
MR. LOPEZ: Good afternoon 
The issue of campaign finance reform has been largely dor-
mant since Buckley was decided in 1976.  But, in the last two or 
three years, reformers have come along and successfully sponsored 
a number of state initiatives and legislation that have brought the 
issue back into focus.150  I happen to have been in the right place at 
the right time and the issue has fallen on my desk; I have become 
the point person for the ACLU on the issue. 
I am an attorney and I am involved in a number of cases 
around the country in which we are challenging this reform.151  In 
some of those cases I am direct counsel; in others I am playing a 
less prominent role, whether it be an amicus writer or merely a 
consultant. 
Having said that, let me tell you that the ACLU itself is divided 
on this issue.152  There is debate within the organization whether 
the dangers or the evils that the proponents of this legislation offer, 
justify the restrictions on the First Amendment.  Within the organi-
zation we are divided. 
 
150. See Hugo Martin, Alarcon-Katz Senate Race a Test for Prop. 208 Politics:  
New fund-raising rules and legal challenge to term limits make picking a winner any-
one’s guess, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at B1 (stating that limits for candidates for the 
state legislature are $250 or $500 for those who agree to spending caps of $300,000 for 
primaries and $400,000 for general elections). 
151. See Vanatta v. Keisling, 931 P.2d 770 (1997); Brown v. State, 680 So.2d 1179 
(1996). 
152. See Mary E. Gale & Ramona Ripson, Who’ll Stop the Flood of Campaign Dol-
lars, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles, Cal.), Nov. 4, 1997, at N11. 
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It is one of those issues, I think, where a significant percentage 
of our constituency disagrees with us, but the national organization 
believes that the principled position is that those restrictions are 
unconstitutional under prevailing precedent.  In addition, we be-
lieve that those precedents should be extended to invalidate some 
of the more creative reforms that are being proposed out there. 
It is not the first time we have had disagreement within the or-
ganization.153  You have probably all heard of the Skokie inci-
dent.154  If you have not, the Skokie incident involved the Nazi 
march through a neighborhood in the suburbs of Chicago where 
many Holocaust survivors lived.155  In the short term, that incident 
caused our membership to decrease significantly, I believe.  But 
ultimately, with exposure, our membership increased dramatically, 
and I think history has shown that the ACLU was on the correct 
side of the issue.156 
Proponents of campaign finance reform point out a lot of prob-
lems with the current system.157  The ACLU really has no dis-
agreement with a lot of those problems that are being asserted.  
That is not an unusual posture for the organization.  There are al-
ways problems in society—whether it is drugs, whether it is ex-
treme violence, whether it is teen pregnancy—but it is the solu-
tions we often point to when we find ourselves fighting laws 
passed in response to those problems.  This is another example 
where we think the government, in an attempt to come to grips 
with what is admittedly a problem, has abandoned any attempt at 
precision, which is required by constitutional jurisprudence, and 
cast a broad net over the entire problem.  This is a very typical 
government response to perceived problems out there—and actual 
 
153. See Amy Keller, Shop Talk, ROLL CALL, Mar. 30, 1998. 
154. See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 
1978); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
155. See J.R. Reid & Bob Warden, 3,000 Protest Against Nazis in Chicago’s Loop, 
WASH. POST, June 25, 1978, at A4. 
156. See Richard B. Sapphire, The Constitutional Status of Hate Speech:  Comments 
on Delgado and Stefanicic, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 491, 499 (1996); see also Nadine Strossen, 
Hate Speech and Pornography:  Do We Have to Choose Between Freedom of Speech and 
Equality?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 449 (1996). 
157. See John Anderson, Colloquai Election Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ADMIN. 
L.J. AM. U. 205 (1994). 
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problems out there. 
We would urge the courts and the legislatures to take some ef-
fort and work within constitutional frameworks that exist for some 
of society’s problems.  We believe, as we have heard from some of 
the speakers today, that disclosure, accountability, and enforce-
ment of existing corruption laws are all sufficient to redress the 
problems. 
Take the issue of foreign money coming into the country and 
influencing elections.  As I understand that, it is illegal.158  So our 
suggestion is not to overhaul the whole system of campaign fi-
nance, but to enforce those laws that make it a crime for foreign 
money to influence federal elections.159 
During the last several years, a number of organizations around 
the country have successfully placed state initiatives on the ballots 
and have dramatically changed the face of money in the election 
process in this country.160 
The ACLU is monitoring those situations and we are involved 
in many of those suits.  About twenty states are going down that 
road right now.161  They have proposed changes in their laws or 
they have enacted changes in their laws that take many different 
forms.  The most common form is a substantial reduction in the 
contribution limits that are out there. 
That actually takes me back to Buckley.  Buckley upheld a 
$1,000 limit.162  For twenty years, most states lived with the 
$1,000 limit established by the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(“FECA”) and the provisions that were upheld in Buckley.  Only 
recently have the states pulled those limits down, and this is their 
idea of reform.163  So we are talking about limits coming all the 
 
158. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441e (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
159. See id. 
160. See Martin, supra note 150; see also Geeta Anand, Mass. Ballot Initiatives 
Paying Off for Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1998, at B1. 
161. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08 (West 1998) (“[N]o person . . . may . . . 
make contributions in excess of $500 to any candidate”). 
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976). 
163. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08 (West 1998) (“[N]o person . . . may . . . 
make contributions in excess of $500 to any candidate”). 
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way down from $1,000 to $50 or $100, sometimes $200.164  Not 
surprisingly, candidates and supporters of those candidates have 
brought challenges to those laws and, by and large, have pre-
vailed.165 
Perhaps two weeks ago you heard about the California limits.  I 
think they were $250 and $500 for state-wide office.166  I am talk-
ing about the state elections.  You understand that a state cannot 
pass a law that impacts a federal election because of pre-emption 
by FECA.  So I am talking about state-wide offices, such as state 
assemblymen, state senators, and mayors.  It could be local elec-
tions as well.  By and large, those efforts have been rejected by the 
courts, and we think we will continue to enjoy some success in that 
forum. 
Let me take you back to Buckley.  It is important to understand 
what exactly occurred in Buckley.  The Court had before it basi-
cally four pieces of legislation: it had contribution limits;167 it had 
independent expenditures;168 it had limits on candidate spending,169 
and it had the system for financing presidential elections.170  The 
Court upheld the $1,000 limit, so contributions by individuals to 
candidates could not exceed $1,000.171  That rule extended to con-
tributions by groups, organizations, corporations, and unions as 
well.172  It was a $1,000 limit. 
The law carved out an exception for political action commit-
tees (“PACs”).173  We all know PACs give more than $1,000.  So a 
 
164. See Howard Schneider & Hamil R. Harris, District Voters Overruled on Cam-
paign Gift Limits; Council Raises $50, $100 Caps Approved in ‘92, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 
1996, at B1 (discussing campaign gift limits in Washington, D.C.). 
165. State of Florida v. Dodd, 561 So.2d 263, 267 (1990) (holding that “the Cam-
paign Financing Act is unconstitutional for its overbroad intrusion upon rights of free 
speech and association”). 
166. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85301 (West 1997). 
167. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-35 (1976). 
168. See id. at 39-60. 
169. See id. at 39-55. 
170. See id. at 85-109. 
171. Id. at 35. 
172. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 591(g) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
173. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 441(a)(2)(A), 608(b)(2) (West 1998); see also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 n.31 (1976) (noting that certain political committees can donate up 
to $5,000 per candidate). 
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union PAC or a corporate PAC—and corporations and unions 
typically have many, many PACs—was allowed to give up to 
$5,000 to a candidate.174 
And then, of course, there was an aggregate limit on the 
amount of money you could contribute to all candidates and PACs, 
and I believe that was $25,000.175 
Now, the Court said you could not limit a candidate’s own 
spending.176  So if a rich candidate came along, that candidate of 
course was free to spend his or her own money as well as all the 
money lawfully raised.  That is still the law, as demonstrated by 
the Huffington and Perot examples.177 
The Court struck down the limits on non-coordinated inde-
pendent expenditures.178  That is a mouthful, non-coordinated in-
dependent expenditures.  What are non-coordinated independent 
expenditures? 
Let me first tell you what coordinated expenditures are.  A co-
ordinated expenditure is when a contributor talks with a candidate 
or the candidate’s committee and then goes out and takes an adver-
tisement that urges the candidate’s election or defeat.179  That is a 
coordinated expenditure.  The Supreme Court said that they were 
going to treat that as a contribution.180  I think that makes sense to 
most people. 
But non-coordinated independent expenditures are those ex-
penditures where the contributor does not talk to the candidate and 
takes out an advertisement or prints 1,000 leaflets.181  The Supreme 
Court said supporters have an unequivocal constitutional right to 
 
174. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(a)(2). 
175. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(2)(C); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 
(1976). 
176. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 59 n.67 (noting that such limits violate the First, Fifth, 
and Ninth Amendments). 
177. See Bob Hohler, Election Finance Targeted in Equality Fight, Big Money Seen 
as Insidious Force, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1997, at A1; see Lauder, supra note 125. 
178. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54; see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). 
179. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-36, 46-48. 
180. Id. 
181. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. 604. 
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do that.182  The Supreme Court has since affirmed that basic prin-
ciple in many subsequent decisions, including a decision in Colo-
rado as recently as two years ago.183 
So there is really no reason to believe that the Supreme Court is 
going to retreat from these two basic rules.  If anything, as Mr. 
Kayser pointed out, they are going to revisit the limit on contribu-
tions because it is just dated—the $1,000, if anything, should be 
adjusted upwards to $3,000 to take into effect inflation—and it 
really has not worked.  Some of the premises that the law is posited 
on are really not there anymore.  Plus, the Court has moved in a 
different direction, I think, from where it was in 1976.184 
Because the Court at that time split the pie, so to speak, be-
tween upholding limits on campaign contributions and striking 
down the limits on independent expenditures, guess what?  FECA 
cannot work.  It cannot work with that dichotomy, because all the 
money that was going into the candidates’ coffers is now being di-
verted to independent expenditures.  Therefore, nothing has been 
accomplished.  Maybe the Court knew that when it split the pie.  
But that is what has gone on. 
Well, understandably, people are frustrated with that, and that 
is why there have been all those reform efforts.  But the answer is 
not to reduce the contribution limits from $1,000 down to $100.  
The answer, if anything, it seems to me, is to address the problem 
of independent expenditures, because there is no accountability 
with independent expenditures, except that they must be reported. 
Like I said, the Court is not going to revisit that issue on inde-
pendent expenditures.  We have to live with that.  I think that is 
correct.  I think the Court is correct.  That is speech at its best.  I—
or you—should be able to go out there and take out an advertise-
ment in a newspaper and spend as much money as I want support-
ing a candidate, as long as it is not a direct contribution to that 
candidate. 
 
182. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
183. Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. 604; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
184. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85; see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mo-
saic:  Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381 
(1992). 
PANEL2.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
380 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:347 
The third part of Buckley, which is a significant predicate for 
the discussion, regards the public financing of elections.185  Now, 
forget contributions and forget independent expenditures.  Public 
financing of elections is when you accept government funds in ex-
change for an agreement to forgo reliance on private funding.186  
That is what we have at the federal level for presidential elections.  
Buckley upheld that system, as long as the decision to participate 
was voluntary and not coerced.187 
There is not a similar system in place for the House of Repre-
sentatives or Senate.  Understand that.  Congress right now is 
struggling with whether or not to change the content of the presi-
dential public financing system that is in place and they are also 
struggling with whether or not to extend that system to the House 
and Senate races.188  I think, however, that the prospects of that 
legislation going anywhere are really very slim. 
We at the ACLU are concerned with the states that have rushed 
to fashion their own public financing alternatives.189  The problem 
is that the states have not patterned those programs after the federal 
system.  They have, by and large, substantially deviated from those 
programs.  We believe that those states—Maine,190 Massachu-
setts,191 Hawaii,192 Kentucky,193 and Minnesota,194 just off the top 
of my mind—have designed programs that are calculated to force 
you into the public financing alternative and to remove any intelli-
gent choice from the process.  In other words, they establish a sys-
 
185. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85, 293-329. 
186. See Don’t Expand Public Financing of Elections, USA Today, Apr. 4, 1997, at 
A13; Doug Ireland, Clean Out the Vote, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 17, 1998, at 26; John E. 
Yang & Helen Dewar, Gingrich Would End Caps On Election Contributions; In Surprise 
Move, Senate to Begin Debate Today, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1997, at A14. 
187. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-86. 
188. See H.R. 794, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 229, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 57, 105th 
Cong. (1997); S. 243, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Yang & Dewar, supra note 186. 
189. See Grant Moos, States Look to Public Campaign Financing to Clean Up Elec-
tion System, WEST’S LEGAL NEWS, July 29, 1996, at 7698, available in West, 
WESTLAW, 1996 WL 419511. 
190. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1121 (West 1997). 
191. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 55A, § 6 (West 1998). 
192. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-226 (1997). 
193. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121A (Banks-Baldwin 1998). 
194. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211A (West 1997). 
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tem of inducements for participation and penalties for non-
participation. 
I will just summarize the system we are challenging in Maine.  
This will give you an idea of how much some of those states are 
willing to push the envelope.  Not all states, however, have pushed 
the envelope.  For example, the New York system described by my 
colleague is really very modest, and I do not think anyone has 
challenged the New York system.195  I do not think the ACLU has 
any problem with the New York system. 
But some of the states have really pushed the envelope.  Maine 
is a case I am involved in.196  Here are the basic parameters: If a 
candidate qualifies for public financing in a Maine state election, 
which is a big if, the candidate can get a lot of money up-front.197  
Basically right up-front, on the day the candidate qualifies, the 
candidate will be paid the equivalent of the amount that was spent 
in the last election.198  So the candidate receives a big chunk of 
money up-front. 
The candidate will also be certified by the State of Maine as a 
“Maine Clean Election Candidate.”199  There is a question right 
now whether or not that certification is going to appear on the bal-
lot to alert voters.200  Those are significant inducements. 
In addition to that, if a candidate’s non-participating opponent 
nevertheless is able to raise a greater amount of money than the 
spending limits the candidate agreed to in exchange for the receipt 
of those public funds, Maine will waive those spending limits and 
pay the candidate the amount of the excess.201 
 
195. The federal system, however, has been challenged.  See Albanese v. Federal 
Election Comm’n, 884 F. Supp. 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing challenge to the con-
gressional election finance system for lack of standing). 
196. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1121 (West 1997). 
197. See id. § 1125; see also Jack Beaudoin, Tax Forum Includes Campaign Fund 
Box, Main Legislative Candidates Would Be Able to Use the Public Funds, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, Feb. 2, 1998, at B1. 
198. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 1125(8)-(9).  The actual amount of fund-
ing reflects a one-time 25% reduction in the average of amounts spent in the 1996 and 
1998 elections.  See id. § 1125(8)(D). 
199. See id. § 1125(5). 
200. See id. 
201. See id. § 1125(9). 
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To make matters worse, Maine will calculate independent ex-
penditures by third parties—by a person who may not even know 
the outside candidates—and will take the value of those independ-
ent expenditures and provide a matching fund to the candidate who 
agrees to public financing.202  Independent expenditures benefiting 
the clean candidate, however, do not count toward that candidate’s 
spending limit. 
Under those circumstances, we think that a candidate has no 
choice but to participate in the public financing alternative, and 
that is pretty much the heart of the case.  I think we will prevail—I 
hope we will prevail—because we believe that the public financing 
choice should be voluntary and we believe that this system cor-
rupts or destroys the voluntariness in that program. 
I would just add that there are many variations on this program.  
Maine is not the most pernicious example out there.  Under the 
system in Kentucky,203 once the outside candidate’s spending 
waives the spending limits, that is, exceeds the amount of money 
that was allocated to the “clean” candidate, the clean candidate re-
ceives matching funds from the state at a two-to-one rate.204  So all 
of a sudden, the inside candidate, who was even with the outside 
candidate, receives a two-to-one match for every excess dollar the 
outside candidate raises.  We think a program that is designed like 
that is not voluntary. 
In Rhode Island, clean candidates can raise contributions in 
$2,000 increments, while outside candidates can only raise it in 
$1,000 increments.205  In Minnesota206 and Hawaii,207 donors to 
clean candidates may take a tax deduction; donors to outside can-
didates cannot take a tax deduction.208  Under those circumstances 
we think that the supporter of the outside candidate is being di-
rectly penalized; it is a direct tax on that person’s speech. 
 
202. See id. §§ 1019, 1125(9). 
203. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121A (Banks-Baldwin 1998). 
204. See id. §§ 121A.030, 121A.060, 121A.080. 
205. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-19 (1998). 
206. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211A (West 1997). 
207. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-226 (1997). 
208. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 55A, § 6; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211A; HAW. 
REV. STAT. §§ 11-226, 11-235-7(g)(2). 
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Those are some of the programs that are out there.  Some are 
more benign than others.  I think the ones that push the envelope 
are going to fall.  I think the ones that come closer to resembling 
New York’s are going to be upheld.  Ultimately, however, the Su-
preme Court is going to have to decide the issue and revisit Buck-
ley. 
MR. BARRETT: We are going to open up to some questions.  I 
just want to start with one.  Several of the speakers relied on me 
essentially.  Those who were opposed to expenditure caps relied on 
the media and disclosure as a key element in dealing with the prob-
lems of quid pro quos and the problems of the campaign finance 
system. 
Well, I tried to address that in my brief remarks at the start, 
which is that basically the quid pro quo story is a withering story.  
It is dying on the pages of newspapers.  Television certainly will 
not cover it to any substantial degree; they would not even cover a 
senatorial investigation of it.  Media managers believe the public is 
not interested in those stories.  I have to fight to get them into the 
pages of the Village Voice.209  And certainly, Rupert Murdoch and 
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, who have their own dealings with the 
governments, have not and are not going to give great play to cam-
paign finance abuses. 
So in regard to disclosure, I find it ironic that Mr. Kayser, who 
was on the Pataki Campaign Committee, supports disclosure be-
cause the Pataki Campaign Committee files their disclosure forms 
alphabetically by first name,210 so it is impossible for reporters to 
discern.  Because the disclosures are filed alphabetically by first 
name, the campaign finance documents must be re-collated and re-
organized.  And Mr. Kayser believes disclosure is the answer. 
I think the question that Mr. Kayser posed is a hard question 
for everyone on the panel, and I would like to have each member 
of the panel try to address it.  He asked, does anyone think gov-
ernment can restrict the number of advertisements you can buy or 
the amount of literature you can print? 
 
209. Mr. Barrett is published regularly in the Village Voice. 
210. See Wayne Barrett, Papering Over Giuliani & Pataki, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 6, 
1998, at 49. 
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I just want to say one other thing about the Ron Lauder cam-
paign.  I covered the Ron Lauder campaign.  Mr. Kayser is confus-
ing two facts.  Mr. Lauder has always been a tremendous cham-
pion of term limits.  He has spent millions of dollars promoting 
term limits.  He did not spend one of the $13 million he spent on 
his campaign to promote term limits.211  All of that money was 
spent on the most negative campaign we have ever seen in New 
York City, directed at mayoral candidate Rudolph Giuliani, be-
cause Mr. Lauder was then an agent of Alfonse D’Amato.212  He 
was not really running for mayor.  He never did a positive com-
mercial about himself.  He spent $13 million in 1989 attacking Ru-
dolph Giuliani, now the incumbent mayor, for not supporting term 
limits.213  Mr. Kayser is confusing that with other television cam-
paigns that Mr. Lauder did conduct supporting term limits.214 
But I think each member of the panel might want to address 
Mr. Kayser’s question, and certainly Mr. Kayser should get a 
chance to rebut some of my statements.  Does anyone think gov-
ernment can restrict the number of advertisements you can buy or 
the amount of literature you can print?  Would anybody want to 
address that? 
MR. JOERSS: Yes.  No, I do not think government can directly 
limit the amount of advertisements you can buy.  What govern-
ment can do is set up voluntary systems similar to the Maine sys-
tem, which I do not think goes too far.  Government can also try to 
talk the media into giving free and discounted air time.  The broad-
cast rights and the airways used by the media are public prop-
erty.215  The rights to the airways are leased by the broadcasters.216  
 
211. See Howard Kurtz, The Sound Bites & the Fury for N.Y.’s Mayoralty; Koch 
and Challengers Rev It Up for Tomorrow’s Primary, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1989, at D1. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. 
214. See Wayne Barrett, Rudy Probed Al:  The Agent Branded a Spy Investigated 
D’Amato, VILLAGE VOICE, July 11, 1995, at 12 (reporting that Ron Lauder initiated a 
separate campaign on the term limits issue). 
215. See Thomas F. Ackley, Note, Political Candidates’ First Amendment Rights 
Can Be Trumped By Journalists’ Editorial Rights:  Candidates Barred From Public 
Television Debate in Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 475, 484-
85 (1998); Camille Kimball, Political Candidate Need to Speak Freely, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Mar. 28, 1998, at D7; Newton N. Minow, Freeing the Public Airwaves From All Forms 
of “Free Air Time”, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 1998, at 23. 
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In that lease, Congress reserves the right to use those broadcast 
airways for the public good.217  So there is legal ground for using 
the airways for debates or candidate advertisements.  This is a way 
that candidates can get their messages out without having to rely 
on raising millions of dollars. 
MR. BARRETT: Anybody else?  Mr. Kastin, I think this goes 
directly to the system that you are operating. 
MR. KASTIN: Right.  I think one point to keep in mind is the 
limits that we are talking about.  For example, the spending limit 
for the recent mayoral election—the general election, not the pri-
mary—was $4.7 million.  I think that is a very reasonable number 
to set for a mayoral campaign that lasts from September to No-
vember.  Technically, any spending limit can be interpreted as lim-
iting in effect the number of pamphlets ultimately printed, but is it 
really affecting the quality of the campaign?  Do New Yorkers 
honestly believe that the number of issues that were raised during 
the campaign and the level of political debate were hindered by the 
spending limit?  I think that because the spending limits are set 
high enough to allow for a reasonable campaign, there is no dan-
ger. 
MR. BARRETT: Mr. Kayser, anyone else? 
MR. KAYSER: I suppose, as a point of personal privilege, I 
would like to respond to a couple of remarks made by Wayne Bar-
rett. 
One, I did not cover the Lauder campaign as a journalist, the 
way Wayne did, but I disagree with his characterization of Ron 
Lauder’s campaigning efforts.  In an election, you vote for the 
candidate whose propositions you agree with.  Wayne acknowl-
edges that Ron Lauder was a significant supporter of term limits.  
So when Ron Lauder injects himself into a campaign and spends 
his money and raises his profile—and there were a lot of organiza-
tions that supported him—there was Change New York and other 
groups involved in fund-raising efforts for financing term limits.  It 
may be that Wayne elected not to cover those aspects or did not re-
 
216. See Ackley, supra note 215, at 484-85; Minow, supra note 215, at 23. 
217. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 396, 548, 554 (West 1998). 
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alize that there was also an agenda relating to term limits.  But 
there was, in terms of organizations and developing infrastructure 
and things that led to the successful campaign later. 
You have to lay the groundwork for change in campaigns.  I 
think, for example, Steve Forbes is doing the same thing with re-
spect to his profile and persona with the issues that he has taken in 
terms of tax reform in the United States, which will probably be 
very fruitful a few years from now.  But you cannot do it over-
night.  There is an educational process associated with it. 
As to the fact that the Pataki campaign donors are listed alpha-
betically by first name.  I am aware of this situation, and my 
awareness of that is why I say there is room for reform.  That leads 
back to the disclosure laws.  There can be much more effective 
disclosure.  You can require by statute how things are to be done—
the timeliness, how things are to be posted, how it is going to be 
organized.  All of that can be legislated. 
I am advocating those changes for disclosure.  I believe the 
disclosure should be effective and should not be used as a subter-
fuge, it should not be done at the last minute, and it should be done 
in an easy way for journalists to have access.  We do need change 
in that area.  So I do not disagree with Wayne at all in that regard. 
MR. LOPEZ: I would like to return to the question on the dis-
tribution of literature.  There are two ways to look at this.  If you 
are talking about placing limits on candidates in exchange for the 
receipt of public financing, I think that is one constitutional ques-
tion.  I think it is quite another, however, if you are talking about 
imposing limits on my right or your right as a non-candidate to 
spend your money on the distribution of literature.  I would hope 
that no one here is suggesting that under any circumstance that is 
an appropriate remedy for what many people see as an evil inde-
pendent expense. 
MR. BARRETT: All right.  How about some questions from 
the audience?  Anybody have any questions? 
QUESTION: A question I know previous speakers have 
touched on but I would like to hear more about is enforcement.  I 
have filled out the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) reports 
and they lack a lot of basic information.  The FEC is also very lax 
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on enforcement.  I also believe that currently the FEC only has 
about a handful of investigators, which hampers any investigation.  
For example, presidential campaigns from 1988 have just paid 
their FEC fines in the last few years.218  Do you think that a 
stepped-up enforcement or the creation of a more non-partisan and 
more powerful FEC would help resolve some of the problems we 
have?  I would also like to hear Mr. Kastin’s comments on how 
New York City handles those kind of problems. 
MR. KASTIN: One important difference between New York 
City’s program and the FEC is that the City’s program conducts 
enforcement during the election cycle.  So, for example, in 1997 
the Giuliani campaign was fined prior to the election.219  Because 
the FEC conducts investigations after the elections, candidates may 
be less concerned about violating campaign finance regulations.  
That element alone does lend some bite to New York City’s pro-
gram because candidates are aware that they may face a fine prior 
to the election if they fail to follow the requirements. 
Another difference between the two is that the members of the 
Campaign Finance Board are non-partisan and the FEC is ap-
pointed equally between Democrats and Republicans.220  That fac-
tor also lends an element of gridlock in the FEC because you natu-
rally are going to have certain members aligned with one 
candidate. 
MR. BARRETT: Let’s just say that the FEC does not have Fa-
ther O’Hare,221 who, speaking of the First Amendment rights, may 
 
218. See Benjamin Weiser & Bill McAllister, The Little Agency That Can’t; Elec-
tion-Law Enforcer is Weak by Design, Paralyzed by Division, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 
1997, at A1; What About FEC? A Simple Route to Cleaner Campaigns, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. 
PAUL STAR TRIB., Oct. 17, 1997, at A26. 
219. In 1997, the New York City Campaign Finance Board fined Mayor Giuliani’s 
re-election campaign $243,490 for exceeding contribution limits.  See Clifford J. Levy, 
Giuliani Campaign Is Fined $220,000 Over Contributions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at 
A1; Jonathan P. Hicks, Chairman of City Campaign Finance Board Calls For Sharp 
Changes in Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at B8, C2 (reporting that the Campaign 
Finance Board temporarily cut off public funds to the Giuliani campaign after finding 
that hundreds of thousands of dollars in contributions to Giuliani had violated the rules). 
220. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998) (“No more than 3 
members [of the 6 appointed by the President] . . . may be affiliated with the same politi-
cal party.”); NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-708(1). 
221. Father Joseph O’Hare is chairman of the New York City Campaign Finance 
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not be re-appointed based on some of the things he just did.222 
MR. GARNER: I am Robert Garner, managing editor of the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Jour-
nal, and I have a broader question on First Amendment rights for 
Mr. Lopez.  You mentioned that there might be a problem with 
conditioning the number of campaign advertisements and pam-
phlets and such on the receipt of public funds.  I want to ask you if 
that would fall under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions? 
MR. LOPEZ: Right.  We do not believe that the government 
should be able to condition the receipt of government benefits on 
the waiver of a constitutional right.  The unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine grew out of cases in which the Supreme Court said 
that you could not do that.223 
Unfortunately, there has been a retreat from those cases, most 
recently in the arts funding context and also in the hospital funding 
context.  According to the recent cases, for example, if you want to 
receive government funds, you cannot conduct abortions;224 if you 
want to get government grants to create art, you cannot do art 
 
Board and the President of Fordham University. 
222. See William Murphy, Missing Out on Budget Process, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 
1998, at A36. 
223. The state cannot attach unconstitutional conditions to the receipt of govern-
ment benefits.  See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that the state 
cannot revoke or withhold a benefit as a penalty for exercising a constitutional right); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that the  state cannot deny a benefit, in-
cluding a contract or other privilege, simply because the intended recipient refuses to relin-
quish a constitutional right); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (same); Frost v. 
Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (refusing to allow California to impose unconstitu-
tional conditions on the use of its highways).  Frost set forth one of the earliest, best-
known, and most forceful statements of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions: 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation 
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guar-
anteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same re-
sult is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a 
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. . . . It is in-
conceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States 
may thus be manipulated out of existence. 
Id. at 593. 
224. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (ruling that a 
state need not commit any resources to performing abortions because nothing in the Constitu-
tion requires states to enter or remain in the abortion business or entitles private physicians 
and their patients to access to public facilities for the performance of abortions). 
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which is pornographic art.225 
MR. GARNER: If I may follow up, didn’t the Court make a 
distinction between unconstitutional conditions and the purchase of 
government services, as in case regarding federal funding for fam-
ily planning clinics?226 
MR. LOPEZ: Yes, but it is one of those distinctions that we 
really think is not a distinction,227 and I guess that is where we 
would part company with the Court. 
MR. BARRETT: Anyone else? 
MR. KAYSER: If I could comment on that question for a min-
ute.  One of the general problems that we have in our society today 
is that we do not live long enough, so our collective memories 
from generation to generation are pretty short.  There are not many 
of us who have a recollection of the way the United States was in 
the 1920s, for example, or the 1930s, before the New Deal. 
 
225. See, e.g., Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976) (ruling 
that governor and Executive Council of New Hampshire did not stifle free expression by 
reversing art grant awarded to literary magazine due to the magazine’s publication of a 
purportedly offensive poem).  But see Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. 
Supp. 1457, 1475-76 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (striking down the National Endowment for the 
Arts’ (“NEA”) “decency” clause for artistic grants), aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), 
cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 118 S. Ct. 554l (1997); Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. 
Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (finding NEA’s certification re-
quirement unconstitutional). 
226. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-97 (1991) (allowing the government to 
prevent the use of federal funds to disseminate abortion-related advice at federally-
funded family planning clinics).  As the Court explained in Rust, “when the government 
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that 
program.”  Id. at 194. 
227. Rust stands for the proposition that the government may make content-based 
choices when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own mes-
sage.  The Court cautioned, however, that its holding in Rust would not apply to public 
fora or to universities, which occupied “a traditional sphere of free expression so funda-
mental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech 
within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government 
funds is restricted.”  Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.  That distinction was tested in Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, in which the Court ruled that a public uni-
versity could not deny funding to a student publication based on its religious content:  as long 
as the publication did not speak for the university.  515 U.S. 819 (1995).  In both Rosenber-
ger and Rust, the Court attempted to draw a fine line between conditions imposed on gov-
ernment-funded private speech and conditions imposed on the government’s own speech or 
that of its surrogates. 
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During this century, the government’s involvement in all sorts 
of different areas of people’s lives has continued to increase.  So 
we face problems with conditioning some government benefit 
upon the release of some right.228  For example, in exchange for 
public housing, one might be forced to waive his Fourth Amend-
ment right against unreasonable search and seizure.  This type of 
exchange is endemic in our society. 
The best way of dealing with it, in my opinion, is to move to-
ward mechanisms which do not depend upon government financ-
ing and which have more empowerment and protections for the in-
dividual.  In this way, you might avoid raising those issues in the 
beginning.  So, for example, you can privatize public housing, you 
sell it off, and you distribute it, basically co-op it, and give people 
the right to own what they are living in.  You put capital into the 
hands of individuals and then you could add greater property pro-
tections for individuals in our society. 
We need a smaller, less intrusive government, with less de-
pendency upon government.  That will protect us with respect to 
our constitutional rights and those unreasonable conditions requir-
ing a person to waive constitutional rights. 
 
228. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (ruling that a state college 
could not refuse to renew a non-tenured professor’s contract in retaliation for his public 
criticism of the school administration).  In Perry, the Court held that a state cannot condi-
tion a benefit on a restriction of protected First Amendment activity even where the bene-
fit is discretionary, rather than an entitlement: 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a per-
son has no “right” to a valuable government benefit and even though the gov-
ernment may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some 
reasons upon which the government may not rely.  It may not deny a benefit to 
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. . . . Such interference with consti-
tutional rights is impermissible. 
Id. at 587 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).  In 
Speiser, the Court ruled that California could not deny a tax exemption to applicants who 
refused to sign a loyalty oath.  The Court rejected the idea that because the tax exemption 
was a discretionary “privilege” or “bounty,” the limitation placed on the “privilege” 
could not be a First Amendment violation: 
[A] discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limita-
tion on free speech. . . . To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in cer-
tain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.  Its deterrent 
effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech. 
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518. 
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MR. BARRETT: Who is next? 
QUESTION: This is a question for anyone who wants to ad-
dress it.  In light of the Supreme Court’s decision two years ago in 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal 
Election Commission,229 where they said that political parties can 
basically spend limitless amounts of money on behalf of political 
candidates.  Besides contribution limits of $1,000 per individual or 
$5,000 per PAC, what is really left to the campaign finance laws 
when any group or any individual can basically run a campaign for 
a candidate? 
MR. LOPEZ: Let me clarify something you said about that 
case that is a mistake.  The Court said that political party spending 
does not violate the contribution limits set down by FECA as long 
as the political party’s spending is not coordinated with the candi-
date.230  In other words, the political party has the right to go out 
and expressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular candi-
date.  The FECA folks said, by definition, political party is the al-
ter-ego of the candidate.231  The Supreme Court did not accept 
it.232  The Court said, as long as it is not coordinated, they are in-
dependent creatures.233 
QUESTION: Just to look at that again.  What is to stop the Re-
publican Party from running Bob Dole’s campaign for him? 
MR. KAYSER: I can answer that.  First, the question you are 
raising is actually the focal point of the investigation and the deci-
sion by U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno not to appoint a special 
prosecutor for President Clinton.234  President Clinton raised 
money and directly oversaw the Democratic National Committee’s 
running of his advertisements during his campaign.235  There was 
clear coordination in fund-raising and everything, all under one en-
 
229. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). 
230. See id. at 608, 613. 
231. See id. at 613. 
232. Id. at 613-14. 
233. Id. at 614-16. 
234. See Ronald J. Ostrow & Jonathan Peterson, Reno Won’t Seek Special Counsel 
on White House Calls Politics, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at A1. 
235. See Lena H. Sun, Huang Accused of Seeking to Mask DNS Funds, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1997, at 16. 
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tity. 
But Janet Reno basically has made the decision, as attorney 
general of the United States, that we no longer have any restric-
tions to speak of that are meaningful under the current statutory 
system.  That is the de facto decision of the attorney general of the 
United States. 
In some ways I agree with her.  I think the best thing is just to 
junk it, move away from it, have full disclosure, effective disclo-
sure, and accept Janet Reno’s decision.  I think that basically that is 
what the American public has decided too.  That is why we do not 
have the people up in arms over what is going on here.  The 
American people do not want the restrictions on either the contri-
butions or expenditures. 
I think that is the minority position.  It has the support and it is 
resonated in journals like the New York Times and in certain other 
journals, who already have a forum and would like to restrict peo-
ple who do not control the media but who need a outlet, because 
that enhances the media on a relevant basis.  As my fellow panelist 
Ed Hayes mentioned earlier, it is a question of whose ox is gored: 
who is trying to advocate something to the detriment of somebody 
else. 
But the First Amendment is there, fortunately, and we have a 
Supreme Court that is going to stand behind it.  The sooner that we 
call it the way it is, move ahead, and get over this—we are wasting 
an awful lot of time over a debate that is going nowhere in terms of 
change in the direction of more restrictions.  What we ought to 
move toward is more liberty, more freedom, more competition, and 
full disclosure.  I think that is what most people want.  I think if 
there were a vote held today, that is the way it would be in the 
United States. 
But the majority decision is not the way it is going to be deter-
mined.  It is going to be determined by the law—the United States 
Constitution. 
MR. BARRETT: We are running out of time.  We have time 
for one more question. 
MR. JOERSS: One quick point.  I think the idea of removing 
all spending and contribution limits and increasing disclosure and 
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calling it reform is somewhat preposterous.  To remove all of the 
laws would create a legalized system of bribery: based on which 
candidates are receiving the money.  There are enough ways that 
the party can run that money around, even with strong disclosure 
laws, that we are not going to get good answers about this.  The 
fundamental problem remains: Huge amounts of capital coming in 
from individuals, which is subverting the democratic process. 
MR. BARRETT: Mr. Joerss, didn’t you indicate in your pres-
entation that the poll showed substantial support for it? 
MR. JOERSS: In the CBS News/New York Times poll, nine out 
of ten Americans supported radical reform of the campaign finance 
structure and say it is broken.236 
MR. BARRETT: Do the polls indicate whether or not they fa-
vor restrictions on contributions or expenditures, or just that they 
want to see some radical change? 
MR. JOERSS: They said the system is broken and needs fix-
ing.  Whether they specifically want to scrap all existing laws ex-
cept disclosure, I do not know, but I would not think so. 
MR. KASTIN: In New York City, the media and public often 
place heavy pressure on politicians to join the program.237  As a re-
sult, the numbers for joining are very high.  As far as New York 
City goes—this may be different than the rest of the country—it is 
clear that the media and the public do want politicians to abide by 
limits. 
MR. BARRETT: Last question. 
QUESTION: Mr. Kayser, wouldn’t the net effect of the system 
that you are proposing, in which there were no restrictions at all, 
lead to having the exact opposite effect of what you are saying?  
 
236. See Lewis supra note 63, at F32. 
237. See ROAD TO REFORM, supra note 121, at 10.  The Campaign Finance Board 
reported that candidates responded to media pressure to join the program: 
 One reason participation has increased from election to election may be the 
increasing attention the Program has received from the media.  Considerable 
dissatisfaction has been expressed by editorial boards at “politics as usual” 
campaigns, and participation in the Program is regarded as an important crite-
rion by which to judge whether a campaign has rejected these practices. 
Id. 
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Would there be, in fact, a new exclusivity of access to media and 
to campaigning—restricted to those who could afford to buy it, or 
is that just the way it is and that’s unfair? 
MR. KAYSER: I do not know.  But when you talk about ex-
clusivity, you are assuming that there is a monolithic aspect to 
wealth and that people who have money all agree with one posi-
tion.  I assume that that is the corollary of what you are saying. 
My experience is that we have a fairly wide distribution of 
wealth in the United States and in the world, but particularly in the 
United States, and that there is a lot of diversity.  I do not find that 
people who have wealth necessarily agree on issues.  In fact, I find 
that people who have wealth are intellectually pretty acute with re-
spect to issues and there is a lot of disagreement.  Therefore, the 
idea that people with money in the private sector or the personal 
sector are going to speak with one voice is just wrong. 
Also, I think that there are diverse opinions embodied in differ-
ent sources, whether it be in television or in newspapers.  We have 
plenty of diversity in the United States.  To suggest that you need 
to put caps on people’s access with money in order to avoid exclu-
sivity or a monopoly on ideas is ludicrous, just ludicrous.  It cannot 
be supported by any objective analysis. 
Why try to regulate something that does not need to be regu-
lated and under our Constitution cannot effectively be regulated?  
It has been shown that way.  Why try to?  The United States is not 
broken.  To the extent that we have tried to do some things under 
our statutory system, which clearly does not work, that is broken.  
And if you want to talk about the public wanting radical reform, 
yes, I am a reformist, I would be in the majority of the poll taken. 
If the right questions were asked, I would suggest that the posi-
tion that I am articulating is the majority position.  But I am saying 
that is really not the issue; the issue is the analytically correct posi-
tion under our Constitution, and that is what should govern the 
day. 
MR. BARRETT: I want to thank everybody for coming and for 
participating in this symposium discussion.  Thank you. 
